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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs 
JOHN SCHMIDT 
De f endant/Appe11ant 
Case No. 930793CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of a charge of 
possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),(b)(ii) 
(1989) rendered by a plea of guilty before the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor on the 20th day of May, 1991. Jurisdiction to hear the 
above entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3)(i) (1952) as 
amended and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the District Court commit reversible error in refusing to 
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant that was 
issued and executed on the 8th day of December, 1990, which search 
warrant authorized a no-knock nighttime search of a residence at 
146 North Harrison in the City of Ogden, County of Weber, State of 
Utah. The standard of review is whether the issuing magistrate 
correctly applied the law to the facts of this case. The Trial 
Court's conclusions of law are given no deference, but are reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Rowe 806 P2nd 730 (1991) 
CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),(b)(ii), 
Possession of a Controlled Substance. 
11
 (2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally 
to possess or use a controlled substance, 
unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order or directly form a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or otherwise authorized 
by this subsection: 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than 
16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty 
of a third degree felony; or 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-5(1) Search and Seizure 
The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it 
be served in the daytime unless the affidavits or oral testimony 
state a reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary in the 
night to seize the property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, 
damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in which case he may 
insert a direction that it be served anytime of the day or night. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-10 No Knock Search Warrant. 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into 
any building room, conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the 
officer executing the warrant may use such force as is reasonably 
necessary to enter. 
* * * * * 
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if the 
magistrate issuing the warrant direct in the warrant that the 
2 
officer need not give notice. The magistrate shall so direct only 
upon proof under oath, the object of the search may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may 
result to any person if notice were given. 
STATgflSNT PF THE CASE; 
This is an appeal from a ruling of the Trial Court on the 30th 
day of April, 1991, wherein the said Court refused to suppress a 
search warrant that was issued authorizing a no knock nighttime 
search of the premises at 146 North Harrison in the City of Ogden, 
County of Weber, State of Utah, where at the time it was executed 
the Defendant was an invited guest at the said premises and as a 
result of said search there was found small amounts of marijuana 
and cocaine in the possession of the Defendant. The Trial Judge 
found that the affidavit contained sufficient information to 
justify the issuance of the said warrant. After the Court refused 
to suppress the search warrant and exclude the evidence found on 
the Defendant, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance before the Honorable Stanton 
M. Taylor on the 20th day of May, 1991. Defendant was sentenced on 
the 17th day of June, 1991 on the said plea to serve a term at the 
Utah State Prison from zero to five years. 
The Defendant filed a notice of appeal with the District Court 
of the Second Judicial District, which appeal was directed to the 
Utah Court of Appeals as Case #930793CA* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was originally charged with two counts, the first 
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possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony. After the District Court refused to suppress 
the evidence obtained as a result of the execution of the no-knock-
nighttime search warrant, the Defendant entered into a plea 
arrangement with the State wherein in return for dismissal of the 
two counts the Defendant would plead guilty to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
As a result of the negotiations between the Defendant and the 
State, the Defendant appeared before the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor on the 20th day of May, 1991 to enter a plea of guilty to 
the amended information. The Defendant appeared for a sentencing 
hearing before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor on the 17th day of 
June, 1991. At the sentencing hearing the Defendant was sentenced 
to serve a term at the Utah State Prison of Zero to five years. 
Prior to the entering into of a plea of guilty, the Defendant, 
through counsel, filed a motion to suppress any evidence found on 
the Defendant as a result of the night-time, no-knock search and 
seizure which was conducted at 146 North Harrison Blvd, in the City 
of Ogden, County of Weber, State of Utah on the 8th day of 
December, 1990. The hearing was held before the Honorable Stanton 
M. Taylor on the 30th day of April, 1991. 
At the hearing Counsel for the Defendant, who was not a 
resident of the premises that was searched, but was a guest, argued 
that under the facts of the St^te v. Rowe case, 806 P2nd 730 (Utah 
App 1991) that he had a expectation of privacy in the residence of 
4 
his host. (T Suppression Hearing Pg's 84-85) 
But the Defendant at the said hearing mainly attacked the 
sufficiency of the magistrate issuing a broad nighttime, no-knock 
all persons search warrant. The said counsel stated: 
11
 It would appear at least from the 
perspective that the affidavit does not have 
any particularized facts that would lend 
itself to the need for a nighttime, no-knock 
warrant. There is — I think the Courts have 
pretty much held if it's a warrant related to 
drugs, that they can probably get a no-knock 
warrant just because of the fact that small 
amounts of drugs can be disposed of readily. 
I think the affidavit indicates that they're 
indicating about *** talking about making 
cocaine purchases, and based on that, the no-
knock portion of the warrant is probably okay. 
Our main objection is that there's 
nothing in the warrant that would indicate 
that there's any basis for a nighttime search 
warrant. The statutes require that there be 
something that can be particularized, to show 
a need for a nighttime warrant. And in this 
particular affidavit, the officers indicate 
that based on their beliefs, that people 
normally have guns, drug dealers normally have 
guns, that the cover of night would be a safer 
way to go in and make an arrest. I mean, I 
just don't feel, when the Court looks at the 
Rowe case, that this is, you know, what the 
Court meant when it outlined some of the 
things that you need to do about getting a 
nighttime search. There's got to be some 
particular reason why this search should be 
conducted at night rather than in the day. I 
think that the conclusion, just bare 
conclusions made by the officers in this 
affidavit don't give the Court anything to 
rely on. There just — there could be 
numerous reasons, none of which have ever been 
explained. I think that the Court now 
requires, before the Judge issues a nighttime, 
no-knock type of warrant, that there 
definitely be something in the affidavit that 
would clearly indicate to the Judge that it's 
reasonable to do this at nighttime. And 
that's what's lacking in this particular 
5 
warrant. (T. Suppression Hearing Pg's 85-86) 
The Court after hearing the arguments of both the Defendant 
and the State stated: 
w
 Leon. Yeah, the implication obviously of 
that, Orme is saying that Leon is good law in 
Utah, but it doesn't apply in this particular 
case because of the circumstances. I find it 
kind of interesting that Judge Garff in his 
concurrence says that we're going to wait to 
determine whether or not Leon is the law in 
the State of Utah. We have Judge Jackson who 
dissents with no comment. So it's kind of 
hard to know what Judge Jackson is dissenting 
based upon. And maybe he just didn't like the 
whole damn thing. I don't know. I can 
sympathize with that, frankly. But they 
certainly leave the Leon issue up in the air. 
I don't agree with your analysis of my 
obligation. Seems to me the Court has an 
obligation to call it the way it sees it. And 
where the Federal Supreme Court has ruled that 
at least with reference to Federal 
Constitutional rights that Leon applies, I 
think I'm entitled, if I wish, to apply the 
Leon doctrine even to— even to state 
constitutional issues because I can't really 
see any substantial divergence in the language 
of Utah Constitution and the language of the 
United States constitution as it relates to 
warrants. So I think that's within my 
prerogative if I choose to do so. Whether I 
do so or not is a different question entirely. 
Concerning the 
nighttime, no-knock provisions, it seems to me 
that the Court has two things upon which it 
could base its decision. The information 
contained in the last paragraph of page three 
and the information contained on four, page 
four which the Court has somewhat criticized 
because it's in the nature of conclusionary 
statements, couched in terms of the statute. 
At any time day or not because there is reason 
to believe it is necessary to seize the 
property prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged, altered— I suppose that 
is somewhat conclusionary, but on the other 
hand, when you're dealing with narcotics, I 
think that's generally the case. And in fact 
almost always is the case. And for other 
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goods reasons as follows. Property— let's 
see, as follows— well, it doesn't say 
anything after as follows, although that may 
very well relate back to the last paragraph of 
page three* 
Now, once again, the terms that are 
somewhat conclusionary in nature, you know, 
they have guns, and because they have guns, we 
believe it would be safer if we went in at 
night as opposed to in the daytime. We'll be 
going in under cover of darkness and so on. 
Some of it's conclusionary, some of it is 
somewhat factual, but it seems to me as a rule 
of evidence, generally speaking, if you 
establish the expertise of the individual, 
which they've doing in previous paragraphs, 
that even an affidavit they should be entitled 
to give opinions, and this seems to me to be 
in the nature of an opinion, that it would be 
safer to go in at night both for the officers 
and non participants. And I interpret that 
although it's somewhat ambiguous, it could be 
other people who are in the premises or may 
very well be neighbors and so forth, innocent 
bystanders, that would be more likely than not 
out and about and subject to being hurt as a 
result of a gun confrontation, so forth. 
So it seems to me, in 
spite of Judge Roth's ruling, that there is 
sufficient evidence, there is sufficient 
information on the face of the affidavit that 
justifies both a no-knock provision and the 
nighttime search. Those are the issues that 
have been presented to me for resolution. 
The Court believes based upon 
the comments that the motion is not well 
taken, and the motion to suppress is denied. 
(T Suppression Hearing Pg's 100-102) 
SUMMARY QF TOE AJRgUMgNT 
Section 77-23-5(1) UCA requires that a magistrate must insert 
a direction the warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless 
the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to 
believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property 
prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for 
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other goods reasons; in which case he may insert a direction that 
it be served any time of the day or night. The mere reason that 
drugs and the conclusion that all drug dealers have guns, absent 
any specific testimony or evidence that guns have been seen, or 
available in the instant case, is not sufficient reason for the 
issuance of a nighttime search warrant. 
AEgPMBWT 
Under Section 77-23-5(1) UCA, 1953, as amended, a magistrate 
must find from either supporting affidavits or oral testimony the 
reasons that a nighttime search is necessary. This Court declared 
in the case of State v. Rowe 806 P2nd 730 (Utah App 1991 at page 
733 (reversed by the Utah State Supreme Court on other grounds 
State v. Rowe 850 P2nd 427 (Utah 1992)) that: 
"The showing required by the present 
statute focuses not upon a positive s 
howing that the property is at the place to be searched, but upon 
whether there are special circumstances which would justify a 
search at night. The statute does not specify how elaborate or 
detailed this showing must be, but merely requires that the 
"affidavit or oral testimony" must support a "reasonable cause" 
determination that a nighttime search is necessary. The precise 
quantum of information which would support this determination is 
not defined in the statute or in Utah case law and, as has been 
observed elsewhere, it is difficult "to anticipate all of the 
numerous factors that may justify the authorization of a nighttime 
search." People v Kimble 44 Cal 3d 480, 749 P2nd 803,810, 244 Cal 
Rep 148,155, cert denied 488 U.S.871, 109 S.Ct 188, 102 L.Ed2d 
157(1988). Nonetheless, the state clearly requires a 
particularized showing either that 1) a search is required in the 
night because the property is on the verge of being "concealed, 
destroyed, damaged, or altered," or 2) "for other good reason." 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-23-5(1) (1980) 
****** 
Nothing in the supporting affidavit supported 
the inclusion of the nighttime service 
authority other than the preprinted language 
referred to above and the information received 
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from the confidential informant. Contrary to 
our view that little more is required to 
justify a "no-knock11 warrant than that the 
search is for narcotics at a residence, we see 
nothing inherent in a narcotics search which 
would necessitate a search at night, even 
though circumstances can easily be imagined 
which would suggest the propriety of such a 
search being made at night." 
Contrast with the State v. Rowe, supra case is the State v. 
Ruiz, case, 843 P2nd 1045 (Utah App 1992 where this Court stated: 
"The affidavit in the present case shows that 
all narcotic related activity at the address 
was observed in the evening hours. "If the 
supporting affidavit made a particularized 
showing that drugs were likely to be sold or 
consumed over the course of the night and 
evidence lost thereby . . • the propriety of 
a nighttime search becomes manifest." Id[ at 
734 n 4. Because the drug transactions 
occurred during the evening hours, no drugs 
would likely be found on the premises during 
the daytime hours. Accordingly, the statutory 
requirement regarding loss or destruction of 
evidence was satisfied." 
In the instant case there was no evidence to support the 
allegation of the affidavit that because guns were involved it was 
safer to issue a nighttime search warrant. Nor was there any 
evidence that guns were found on the premises when the search and 
seizure was actually made. 
CQffCkUSIQN 
Appellant/Defendant requests this Court to suppress the 
evidence of cocaine and marijuana found on the person of the 
Defendant on the basis the issuing magistrate was not presented 
sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements of Section 77-23-
5(1) UCA. 
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UNTIL THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH UNDER STATE LAW FOUND NO 
LEON EXCEPTION, REFUSE TO APPLY IT, WOULD ALSO MAKE IT BINDING 
ON THE COURTS HERE. 
I ALSO DIRECTED YOUR ATTENTION, YOUR HONOP., IN THE BRIEF 
MEMORANDUM PUT TOGETHER SOME SITUATIONS WHERE OUR LOCAL JUDGES 
HAVE SPECIFICALLY ADOPTED, WHICH I BELIEVE IS PRECEDENT FOR 
YOUR HONOR TO USE. AND HAVE APPLIED THE HOLDING OF UNITED 
STATES VERSUS LEON WHEN THEY FOUND THAT THE OFFICER DID IN 
GOOD FAITH EXECUTE A WARRANT THAT HE OR SHE BELIEVED TO BE 
VALID. WHICH WAS THEN IN FACT FACIALLY INVALID, BUT BECAUSE 
OF THEIR RELIANCE, APPLIED THE HOLDING OF LEON, AND THE 
EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED AS FAR AS RULE 12(G). THAT WAS 
INVALIDATED BECAUSE IT WENT BEYOND LEON. WHICH AGAIN, WE 
DIDN'T HAVE THE — WENT BEYOND ~- I'M SORRY, WENT BEYOND WHAT 
OUR U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS DETERMINED WAS A LEGITIMATE AREA. 
AND ACTUALLY CUT BACK DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS. 
MR. SULLIVAN POINTS TO THE MCNDOZA CASE. THAT WAS A 
TRAFFIC STOP CASE IN WHICH THE STATE TRIED.TO ARGUE LEON. IT 
DIDN'T DEAL WITH A WARRANT. AND THEY ALSO TRIED TO ARGUE 
12<G>, AND THE COURT CAME BACK AND SAID, NOT ONLY ARE WE NOT 
GOING TO EXTEND LEON IN THIS CASE TO THE TRAFFIC STOP OR THE 
GOOD FAITH, BECAUSE IT DIDN'T INVOLVE A WARRANT, BUT THEY ALSO 
SAID WE THINK THAT YOUR APPLICATION OF 12(G) IS MISPLACED 
BECAUSE WE THINK 12(G) GOES TOO FAR AND IT'S IN FACT 
INVALIDATED THE SECTION. IT ISN'T THE POSITION THAT THE 
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STATE*S RAISED, YOUR HONOR, THAT IN FACT THIS DOES MAKE OUT A 
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE NO-KNOCK. OR THE NIGHTTIME- BUT IF 
IT'S THE COURT'S OPINION THAT IT DOES NOT, THESE FACTS -- AND 
OFFICER WENTLAND'S TAKEN THE TIME TO WRITE WHAT WE THINK IS A 
SUFFICIENT PASTS FOR JUDGE WEST ISSUING THE NIGHTTIME SERVICE, 
THIS IS A CASE THAT WE SUBMIT FALLS SQUARELY WITHIN THE 
HOLDING OF LEON. THE OFFICER RELIED IN GOOD FAITH. THERE 
WOULD BE NOTHING TO BE GAINED, AS THE LEON CASE SAID, BY-
APPLYING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WHEN THE POLICE HAVE f\CTED IN 
GOOD FAITH AS OPPOSED TO THE MAGISTRATE MISREADING IT AND NOT 
ASKING FOR MORE OR REQUIRING MORE BEFORE ISSUING IT. 
HAVING SAID THAT, YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD SUBMIT IT FOR YOUR 
DECISION. 
MR. SULLIVAN: JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR, MR- HEWARD 
TALKS ABOUT RULE 12(G). AND THE FACT THAT THE COURT FOUND JT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT WAS CUTTING BACK ON THE 
DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS. THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT THEY'RE TRYING TO DO 
NOW BY GETTING THE COURT TO RELY ON THE LEON DECISION PRIOR TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OR THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SAYING 
THAT THAT'S THE LAW IN UTAH. HE WOULD LIKE TO APPLY THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND SAY THAT, YOU KNOW, THAT BECAUSE UTAH 
HASN'T DECIDED THIS CASE, WE HAVE TO FOLLOW THE SUPREME 
COURT. I DON'T THINK THAT'S IN FACT THE CASE. I MEAN, WHAT 
MR. HEWARD IS SAYING IS THAT THE FEDERAL LAW CAN COME IN NOW 
AND TAKE OUR DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS AWAY. AND I DON'T THINK 
0?5-
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THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THERE'S ANY BASIS FOP A NIGHTTIME 
SEARCH WARRANT. THE STATUTES REQUIRE THAT THERE BE SOMETHING 
THAT CAN BE PARTICULARIZED, TO SHOW A NEED FOR A NIGHTTIME 
WARRANT. AND IN THIS PARTICULAR AFFIDAVIT, THE OFFICERS 
INDICATE THAT BASED ON THEIR BELIEFS, THAT PEOPLE NORMALLY 
HAVE GUNS, DRUG DEALERS NORMALLY HAVE GUNS, THAT THE COVER OF 
NIGHT WOULD BE A SAFER WAY TO GO IN AND MAKE AN ARREST. I 
MEAN, I JUST DON1T FEEL, WHEN THE COURT LOOKS AT THE ROWE 
CASE, THAT THIS IS, YOU KNOW, WHAT THE COURT MEANT WHEN IT 
OUTLINED SOME OF THE THINGS THAT YOU NEED TO DO ABOUT GETTING 
A NIGHTTIME SEARCH. THERE'S GOT TO BE SOME PARTICULAR REASON 
WHY THIS SEARCH SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AT NIGHT RATHER THAN IN 
THE DAY. I THINK THAT THE CONCLUSION, JUST BARE CONCLUSIONS 
MADE BY THE OFFICERS IN THIS AFFIDAVIT DON'T GIVE THE COURT 
ANYTHING TO RELY ON. THERE JUST -- THERE COULD BE NUMEROUS 
REASONS, NONE OF WHICH HAVE EVER BEEN EXPLAINED. I THINK THAT 
THE COURT NOW REQUIRES, BEFORE THE JUDGE ISSUES A NIGHTTIME, 
NO-KNOCK TYPE OF WARRANT, THAT THERE DEFINITELY BE SOMETHING 
IN THE AFFIDAVIT THAT WOULD CLEARLY INDICATE TO THE JUDGE THAT 
IT'S REASONABLE TO DO THIS AT NIGHTTIME. AND THAT'S WHAT'S 
LACKING IN THIS PARTICULAR WARRANT. 
I KNOW THAT MR. — WELL, THE MAIN ISSUE FOR THE STATE I 
GUESS ON REBUTTAL OR WHAT THEY'VE RAISED, AND WHAT THEY RAISED 
ARGUING THIS EXACT SAME WARRANT TO JUDGE ROTH ABOUT TWO WEEKS 
AGO, IS THE FACT THAT ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE FOUND THAT THE 
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MR. SULLIVAN: THAT'S LEON. 
THE COURT: LEON. YEAH, THE IMPLICATION OBVIOUSLY OF 
THAT, ORME IS SAYING THAT LEON IS GOOD LAW I'N UTAH, BUT IT 
DQESN'T APPLY IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE BECAUSE QF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. I FIND IT KIND OF INTERESTING THAT JUDGE GfiRFF 
IN HIS CONCURRENCE SAYS THAT WE'RE GOING TO WAIT TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER OR NOT LEON IS THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH- WE HAVE 
JUDGE JACKSON WHO DISSENTS WITH NO COMMENT. SO IT'S KIND OF 
HARD TO KNOW WHAT JUDGE JACKSON IS DISSENTING BASED UPON. AND 
i 
MAYBE HE JUST DIDN'T LIKE THE WHOLE DAMN THING. I DON'T 
KNOW. I CAN SYMPATHIZE WITH THAT, FRANKLY. BUT THEY 
CERTAINLY LEAVE THE LEON ISSUE UP IN THE AIR. I DON'T AGREE 
WITH YOUR ANALYSIS OF MY OBLIGATION. SEEMS TO ME THE COURT 
HAS AN OBLIGATION TO CALL IT THE WAY IT SEES IT. AND WHERE 
THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT HAS RULED THAT AT LEAST WITH 
REFERENCE TO FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THAT LEON APPLIES, 
I THINK I'M ENTITLED, IF I WISH. TO APPLY THE LEON DOCTRINE 
E'^EN TO — E'^EN TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES BECAUSE I CAN'T 
REALLY SEE ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIVERGENCE IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AS IT RELATES TO WARRANTS. SO I THINK THAT'S 
WITHIN MY PREROGATIVE IF I CHOOSE TO DO SO. WHETHER I DO SO 
OR NOT IS A DIFFERENT QUESTION ENTIRELY. 
CONCERNING THE NIGHTTIME, NO-KNOCK PROVISIONS. IT SEEMS 
TO ME THAT THE COURT HAS TWO THINGS UPON WHICH IT COULD BASE 
-l /' 100 
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ITS DECISION. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH 
OF PAGE THREE AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ON FOUR, PAGE FOUR 
^NICH THE COURT HAG SOMEWHAT CRITICIZED BECAUSE IT'S IN THE 
NATURE OF CONCLUSIONARY STATEMENTS, COUCHED IN TERMS OF THE 
STATUTE. AT ANY TIME DAY OR NOT BECAUSE THERE IS REASON TO 
BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO SEIZE THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO IT 
BEING CONCEALED, DESTROYED, DAMAGED, ALTERED -•-• I SUPPOSE THAT 
THAT IS SOMEWHAT CONCLUSIONARY, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN 
YOU'RE DEALING WITH NARCOTICS, I THINK THAT'S GENERALLY THE 
CASE. AND IN FACT ALMOST ALWAYS IS THE CASE. AND FOR OTHER 
GOOD REASONS AS FOLLOWS. PROPERTY — LET*S SEE, AS FOLLOWS --
WELL, IT DOESN'T SAY ANYTHING AFTER AS FOLLOWS, ALTHOUGH THAT 
MAY VERY WELL RELATE BACK TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 
THREE. 
NOW, ONCE AGAIN, THE TERMS THAT ARE SOMEWHAT 
CONCLUSIONARY IN NATURE, YOU KNOW, THEY HAVE GUNS, AND BECAUSE 
THEY HAVE GUNS, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE SAFER IF WE WENT IN AT 
NIGHT AS OPPOSED TO IN THE DAYTIME. WE'LL BE GOING IN UNDER-
COVER OF DARKNESS AND SO ON. SOME OF IT'S CONCLUSIONARY, SOME 
OF IT IS SOMEWHAT FACTUAL, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME AS A RULE OF 
EVIDENCE, GENERALLY SPEAKING, IF YOU ESTABLISH THE EXPERTISE 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL, UHICN THEY'VE DONE IN PREVIOUS PARAGRAPHS, 
THAT E^EN AN AFFIDAVIT THEY SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO GIVE 
OPINIONS, AND THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE IN THE NATURE OF AN 
OPINION, THAT IT WOULD BE SAFER TO GO IN AT NIGHT BOTH FOR THE 
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OFFIEERS'' AND NONPARTICl'PANTS. AND I JNTEPPRET THAT ALTHOUGH 
IT'S SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS, IT COULD £E EITHER PEOPLE WHO ARE IN 
THE PREMISES OR MAY VERY WELL BE NEIGHBORS AND SO FORTH. 
INNOCENT BYSTANDERS, THAT WOULD BE MORE LIKELY THAN NOT OUT 
AND ABOUT AND SUBJECT TO BEING HURT AS A RESULT OF A GUN 
CONFRONTATION, SO FORTH. 
SO IT SEEMS TO ME, IN SPITE OF JUDGE ROTH'S RULING, THAT 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, THERE IS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION 
ON THE FACE OF THE AFFIDAVIT THAT JUSTIFIES BOTH A NQ-KMQCK 
PROVISION AND THE NIGHTTIME SEARCH. THOSE ARE THE ISSUES THAT 
HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO ME FOR RESOLUTION. 
THE COURT BELIEVES BASED UPON THE COMMENTS THAT THE 
MOTION IS NOT WELL TAKEN, AND THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS IS 
DENIED- IS Ti-IERE ANY PART OF WHAT YOU'VE TALKED ABOUT, MR. 
SULLIVAN, THAT WE HAVEN'T ADDRESSED? OR IS THAT.BAGICALLY 
WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT? 
MR. SULLIVAN: I BELIEVE THAT'S BASICALLY WHAT WE'VE 
TALKED ABOUT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, WHERE ARE WE GOING FROM HERE? 
MR. SULLIVAN; BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD. 
THE COURT: PARDON ME? 
MR. SULLIVAN: WE'LL START TALKING, GET THIS THING 
RESOLVED. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHY DON'T WE — SO WE DON'T 
LOSE TRACK OF THIS, WHY DON'T WE PUT IT BACK ON THE MOTION 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
***************************************************************** 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the affiant has reason to believe that: 
(X) On the person(s) of: 
1 — PATRICK 0. BARNES 
2 — RAELENE BARNES 
3 — LUANNB ORVIS 
4 — BRETT THOMAS 
5 — TAMI VARGO 
6— ALL PERSONS ON THE PREMISES OF 146 HARRISON BLVD. (basement 
apartment) 
(X) On the premises known as: 146 HARRISON BLVD. (basement 
apartment), red brick house with white trim, two car garage, 
located on the east side of HARRISON BLVD. 
( ) In the vehicle(s) described as: 
1—1966 Chev. Corvair, Utah pl-ate#618DDT 
2—1966 Chev. Corvair, Utah plate#VSB839 
3—1976 Toyota, Utah plate#582DHE 
4—1976 Ford Truck, Utah plate#0191CD 
5—1989 Chev., Utah plate#756DPJ 
6—not on file, Utah plate#553EAB,(brown Plymouth) 
In the City of OGDEN , County of WEBER 
State of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
1—MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form. 
2—MATERIAL8 USED TO PACKAGE MARIJUANA, specifically, plastic 
sandwich bags. 
3 — MATERIALS FOR USING MARIJUANA: 
a—cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with 
adhesive on one side, 
b—pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
c—-roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being 
smoked* 
4—PERSONAL NOTES, records of narcotic transactions, listing names, 
dates, amounts sold. 
5—FRUITS OF NARCOTIC TRANSACTIONS, U.S. Currency, cash in various 
denominations. 
6—ALL HANDGUNS, RIFLES, AND OTHER WEAPONS THAT CAN PRODUCE BODILY 
INJURY. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed 
(X) Has been used, or is possessed with the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an 
offense 
(X) Is evidence of illegal conduct 
AFFIDAVIT POR SEARCH WARRANT PAGE 2 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant 
are: 
CI#2 contacted your affiant in April of 1990 and reported that Pat 
Barnes of 146 Harrison was selling pound quantities of marijuana 
to Russell and Marianne Madsen of 587 4th street. An investigation 
was initiated and on 3 May 1990 Agents of the Weber/Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force executed a search warrant at 587 4th street. 
Several controlled substances and items of drug paraphernalia were 
found inside the residence. Both subjects were arrested, charged 
and convicted on possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia 
charges• During your affiants investigation Patrick 0. Barnes was 
observed arriving at the residence and departing a short time 
later. 
Your Affiant initiated an investigation in May 1990, after 
receiving information from a confidential source(CI#1) that Pat and 
Raelene Barnes were selling marijuana* 
CI#1 was introduced to the suspects by Luanne Orvis, who is 
currently on probation for Distribution of Cocaine in Weber County. 
CI#1 made a buy of one ounce of marijuana from Raelene Barnes on 
11/20/90/ under the control and surveillance of your affiant, at 
146 Harrison. Clfl reported observing marijuana, weight scales, 
and money inside a safe located in the bedroom closet of the 
residence which is occupied by Patrick and Raelene Barnes. 
CI#1 has also reported Luanne Orvis, Tami Vargo and Brett Thomas, 
are living in the basement apartment or 14 6 Harrison and are 
selling marijuana supplied to them by Pat Barnes. Vargo and Thomas 
are pending charges in Weber County for possession of 
methamphetamine and distribution of cocaine. CI#1 has purchased 
controlled substances from Vargo and Thomas under the control of 
your affiant. CI#1 purchased one quarter ounce of marijuana from 
Luanne Orvis on 11/27/90, under the control and supervision of 
Strike Force Agents. 
Your affiant has observed the transportation of controlled 
substances inside the following vehicles during this investigation 
and^requests authorization to search these vehicles: 
1—1966 Chev corvair, Utah plate #6ieDDT 
2—1966 Chev Corvair, Utah plate <VSBS39 
3—1976 Toyota, Utah plate I582DHE 
4—1976 Ford Truck, Utah plate #0191CD 
5—1989 Chev, Utah plate #756DPJ 
6—not on file, Utah plate I553EAB (brown plymouth) 
Your affiant conducted a criminal history investigation of Patrick 
O. Barnes and Raelene Barnes. P.Barnes was convicted of a drug 
charge in 1971 and acquitted of a second charge in 1972. R.Barnes 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT PAGE 3 
showed no past criminal history. 
on 12/6/90, CI#1 reported observing the sales of controlled 
substances inside the residence and the suspects smoking marijuana. 
Your affiant has been a Police Officer for fifteen years including 
five years as a Federal Police Officer and five years as a Peace 
Officer employed by the South Ogden Police Department. Your 
Affiant has been assigned as an investigator with the Weber/Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force since April 19 90. Your affiant has 
completed forty hours of training in Basic Narcotics Investigation 
sponsored by Dtah P.O.S.T. and eighty hours of Narcotics 
Investigation sponsored by the Drug Enforcement Administration. 
Your affiant has conducted numerous narcotics investigations and 
undercover drug purchases. 
Your Affiant believes that the named premises, and person should 
be searched for drug paraphernalia. Affiant knows from experience 
and training that these items are almost always found on premises 
where narcotic search warrants have been served. Your Affiant also 
knows that the suspect must keep such items on hand to test or to 
allow customers to use the substance being purchased. 
Your Affiant believes the premises should be searched for records 
of narcotics sales and residency papers. Your affiant knows from 
past execution of numerous search warrants that suspects often keep 
such records to show amounts purchased, dates of purchases, who 
purchased, and especially drug indebtedness. 
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be searched 
for packaging material. Suspects selling Marijuana have to package 
the drug from larger quantities to be sold. Further, your Affiant 
believes that the premises is an ongoing operation, and these items 
would be on hand for the purpose of selling the substance. 
Your Affiant prays for a night time service as well as no-knock 
service of the warrant. Your Affiant knows from experience and 
training that more and more narcotics dealers are arming themselves 
for protection against one another as well as from narcotics users. 
Your Affiant has been on numerous narcotic search warrants where 
firearms are available to suspects Inside the premises. Further, 
your affiant believes it is safer for the officers serving the 
yajrant ftg veil a« nonj^particlpanta to tha narcotic sales; if the 
officers have the cover of darkness as well as no-knock service. 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT PAGE 4 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because: 
CI#1 has provided information in three past narcotics 
investigations which have led to the arrest and conviction of seven 
offenders. Your affiant conducted a background investigation of 
the CI and verified personal information given by the CI. The CI 
has provided information about all of the subjects which was 
verified by your affiants investigation. The CI is not a narcotics 
user and is not pending any criminal charges. 
The following information corroborates the facts given by the 
confidential informant: 
The CI has provided names, addresses, and vehicle descriptions of 
the subjects which have been verified by your affiant. The CI has 
purchased controlled substances from the subjects on six separate 
dates within the past seven months with two of the buys within the 
past two weeks. 
Wherefore the affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
( ) In the daytime 
(X) At any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to 
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered or for 
other good reasons as follows: 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested 
warrant not be required to give notice of his authority or purpose 
because: 
(X) The property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed 
of or secreted. 
(X) Physical harm may result to any person if notice were 
given. 
This danger believes to exist because: 
UJMic^t^Tl^l^ \J^*u^j*&*y 
AFFIANT TITLE 
SUBSCRIBED AND 8W0RN TO BEFORE ME THIS (J^ PAX OF P&JS^rf? 19 <*0 
JUDGE 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
***************************************************************** 
SEARCH WARRANT 
TO ANY PEACE OPPICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me 
by: WILLIAM WENTLAND , I am satisfied that there is probable 
cause to believe that: 
(X) On the person(s) of: 
1—PATRICK 0. BARNES 
2—RAELENE BARNES 
3—LUANNE ORVIS 
4—BRETT THOMAS 
5—TAMI VARGO 
6—ALL PERSONS ON THE PREMISES OF 146 HARRISON BLVD (basement 
apartment) 
(X) On the premises known as: 146 HARRISON BLVD. (basement 
apartment) red briclc house with vhite trim, two car garage, located 
ont eh east side of Harrison Blvd. 
(X) In the vehicle(s) described as: 
1—1966 Chev Corvair, Utah plate #618DDT 
2 — 1966 Chev Corvair, Utah plate #VSB839 
3--1976 Toyota, Utah plate #582DHE 
4—1976 Ford Truck, Utah plate #0191CD 
5—1989 Chev, Utah plate #756DPJ 
6—not on file, Utah plate #553EAB (brovn plymouth) 
In the city of OGDEN , County of WEBER 
State of Utah, there is not being possessed or concealed certain 
property or evidence described as: 
1—MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form. 
2—MATERIALS USED TO PACKAGE MARIJUANA, specifically, plastic 
sandwich bags. 
3—MATERIALS FOR USING MARIJUANA: 
a—cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with 
adhesive on one side, 
b—pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
c—roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being 
smoked* 
4—PERSONAL NOTES, records of narcotic transactions, listing names, 
dates, and amounts sold. 
5—FRUITS OF NARCOTIC TRANSACTIONS, U.8. Currency, cash in various 
denominations. 
6—ALL HANDGUNS, RIFLES, AND OTHER WEAPONS THAT CAN PRODUCE BODILY 
INJURY• 
CONTINUED 
SEARCH WARRANT PAGE 2 
Which property or evidence: 
(X) Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed 
(X) Has been used, or is possessed with the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an 
offense 
(X) Is evidence of illegal conduct 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED 
( ) In the daytime 
(X) At any time, day or night 
(X) To execute without notice of authority or purpose 
To make a search of the above named or described person(s), 
premises and vehicle(s) for the herein above described property or 
evidence, and if you find the same, or any part thereof, to bring 
it forthwith before me at the CIRCUIT Court, County of WEBER 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody subject to 
the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND DATED THIsJ^T DAY OF Vfi&W'tf 19*^ 
JUDGE 
